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a concomitant of the tort action - the personal injury statute of limitations. Accordingly, plaintiff's action in strict products liability was upheld as timely, having been commenced within three years of the injury.41 The action for breach of warranty, however, was dismissed on
the ground that Mendel was still controlling authority for this action
until the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise.
It is anticipated that the Court of Appeals will consider Rivera in
the near future, and, by affirmance, solidify its adoption of strict
products liability.42 In situations similar to Rivera, where the sale has
occurred years before, or Codling, where the jury finds a defect but an
absence of negligence, the need is clearly demonstrated for an alternative cause of action in strict products liability. Rivera presents an ideal
opportunity for the Court of Appeals to lend much-needed clarity to
this area of the law.
CPLR 214(6): Cause of action for professional malpractice held to accrue no later than the time of termination of parties' professional relationship.
Generally, a cause of action for malpractice accrues at the time of
the wrongful acts or omissions of the professional. 43 Applying this rule,
the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Sosnow v. Paul,44 dismissed a complaint for malpractice filed against two architects after the
three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214(6) had expired.
The dismissal resulted despite the apparent inability of the nonprofessional plaintiff to discover the negligence until the action was timebarred.
41 Two judges dissented on the ground that Codling had not established a new cause
of action for strict liability and thus, they felt, Mendel was directly applicable. 44 App.
Div. 2d at 326-29, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 664-67.
42 Chief Judge Breitel, as evidenced by his dissent in Mendel, 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253
N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495, has long been an advocate of the recognition of strict
products liability in tort.
4
3See, e.g., Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d
142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963); Gilbert Properties, Inc. v. Millstein, 40 App. Div. 2d 100, 338
N.Y.S.2d 870 (1st Dep't 1972); Seger v. Cornwell, 44 Misc. 2d 994, 255 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup.
Ct. Albany County 1964).
Two exceptions to this rule exist. Where the negligence charged involves the leaving
of a foreign object in the body of a patient by a physician, the action does not accrue until
the patient could reasonably have discovered the injury. See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen.
Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 45 STr.JOHN's L. REv. 500, 508 (1971). In addition, Borgia v. City of New York, 12
N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962), established the continuous treatment
doctrine, whereby the accrual of a malpractice cause of action is delayed until the services
of the physician for the same or related injuries terminate. Accord, O'Laughlin v. Salamanca Hosp. Dist. Authority, 36 App. Div. 2d 51, 319 N.Y.S.2d 128 (4th Dep't 1971).
44 48 App. Div. 2d 978, 852 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dep't 1974).
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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE

The defendants in Sosnow were retained to supply architectural
services for the construction of several apartment buildings. The buildings, completed in April 1965, were constructed in accordance with
plans supplied by the defendants. Subsequently, all the buildings began
to exhibit structural stress, including cracking and bulging of extensive
areas of exterior masonry. In an action commenced in September 1971,
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' negligent failure to provide in
their specifications for expansion and control joints throughout the
building had caused the deterioration of the masonry. The Supreme
Court, Nassau County, upheld the plaintiffs' contention that the cause
of action did not accrue until the malpractice was discovered. 45 Adhering strictly to precedent, the Second Department, in a memorandum
opinion, reversed and dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the cause
of action accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, on the
date of the completion of the defendants' performance, thereby barring
this action.

46

The plaintiffs relied principally upon Flanagan v. Mount Eden
GeneralHospital,47 wherein the Court of Appeals held that in a medical
malpractice action in which the negligence charged was the leaving of
a foreign object in a patient's body, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the patient could reasonably have discovered the malpractice. 48 The Flanagan holding, however, has been largely limited to
foreign object cases. 49 As a result, the majority in Sosnow declined to
extend the application of the rule to architectural malpractice suits.50
In their memorandum of dissent, Justices Benjamin and Munder
argued that a cause of action for negligence only arises when the negligent act creates damage or injury to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the
dissenters concluded that the malpractice action accrued, and the
45 Id. at 978, 352 N.YS.2d at 503.

46 Id.
4724 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly
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500, 508 (1971).

48 See note 43 supra.

49 See Schiffman v. Hosp. for Joint Diseases, 86 App. Div. 2d 31, 319 N.Y.S.2d 674
(2d Dep't 1971).
50 The Flanagan discovery rule, although initially strictly limited to foreign object

cases, has been liberalized. For example, in Murphy v. St. Charles Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d
64, 312 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JoHN's L.
REy. 500, 507 (1971), the Flanagan rule was extended to a malpractice action for the
breaking of a prosthetic device placed in the plaintiff's hip four years earlier. The discovery rule has also been applied to an injury caused to the plaintiff's pancreas during an
operation for the removal of his spleen and discovered four years later. Dobbins v.
Clifford, 39 App. Div. 2d 1, 830 N.Y.S.2d 743 (4th Dep't 1972), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 148, 153 (1972).
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statute of limitations began to run, when the damage to the buildings
occurred, rather than upon the completion of the defendants' services.,,
To hold as did the Sosnow majority, that a cause of action accrues,
and the statute of limitations begins to run, no later than the termination of the parties' professional relationship, penalizes the layman for
his lack of expertise. The dissent offers the more realistic alternative of
focusing upon the time at which actual damage or injury occurs. Until
that point, tie lay client should be entitled to rely upon the competence
of the professional.
ARTICLE 3-

JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE
AND CHOICE OF COURT

CPLR 302(b): Court retains personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants in matrimonial actions.
Effective June 7, 1974, the Legislature has renumbered the previous subdivision (b) of CPLR 302 to become subdivision (c), and has
inserted a new subdivision (b).52 This new subdivision allows the court
to maintain personal jurisdiction, in matrimonial actions or family
court proceedings involving support or alimony, over non-resident or
non-domiciliary defendants. 53 In order to exercise personal jurisdiction
in such situations, the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) the
party who is seeking support must be a domiciliary or resident of New
York when the request is made; and (2) New York must have been the
parties' matrimonial domicile before their separation, or the plaintiff
must have been abandoned by the defendant in New York, or the defendant's obligation to pay support or alimony must have accrued under
either the law of New York or an agreement executed in New York. 4
51The dissenters relied in part upon Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co.,
270 N.Y. 287, 800, 200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936), wherein Judge Lehman observed:
It is only the injury to person or property arising from negligence which constitutes an invasion of a personal right, protected by law, and, therefore, an actionable wrong ... Through lack of care a person may set in motion forces which
touch the person or property of another only after a long interval of time . . .
and then only through new, fortuitous conditions. There can be no doubt that
a cause of action accrues only when the forces wrongfully put in motion produce
injury.
In 1962, the Law Revision Commission recommended legislation that would have
postponed the time of accrual for a malpractice action until the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting the malpractice. See N.Y. Sass. LAws [1962] 3392-93 (McKinney);
1 WK&M q 214.21. Prior to this, a committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York had suggested the adoption of a discovery accrual rule for medical malpractice actions. See 13 RacoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 465-66 (1958). In neither instance did the Legislature adopt the recommendations.
52 N.Y. Sass. LAws [1974], ch. 859, § 1 (McKinney).
58 Id.
54 Id.

